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Assaad, R and El-adaway, I H (2020) Enhancing the Knowledge of Construction Business Failure: A Social Network Analysis Approach. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06), 04020052.
Chew, Y T E, Atay, E and Bayraktaroglu, S (2020) Female Engineers’ Happiness and Productivity in Organizations with Paternalistic Culture. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Dhal, M (2020) Labor Stand: Face of Precarious Migrant Construction Workers in India. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Herrera, R F, Mourgues, C, Alarcón, L F and Pellicer, E (2020) Understanding Interactions between Design Team Members of Construction Projects Using Social Network Analysis. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Hoseini, E, Bosch-Rekveldt, M and Hertogh, M (2020) Cost Contingency and Cost Evolvement of Construction Projects in the Preconstruction Phase. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Jang, Y, Song, K, Park, M and Ahn, Y (2020) Classifying the Business Model Types of International Construction Contractors. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Jin, Z and Gambatese, J (2020) Exploring the Potential of Technological Innovations for Temporary Structures: A Survey Study. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Li, G, Zhang, G, Chen, C and Martek, I (2020) Empirical Bid or No Bid Decision Process in International Construction Projects: Structural Equation Modeling Framework. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Li, S, Wu, X, Wang, X and Hu, S (2020) Relationship between Social Capital, Safety Competency, and Safety Behaviors of Construction Workers. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Liang, Y, Ashuri, B and Sun, W (2020) Analysis of the Variability of Project Cost and Schedule Performance in the Design-Build Environment. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Liu, X, Wang, X, Zhao, Y and Xia, N (2020) Solving Workplace Deviant Behavior in Construction by Leader–Member Exchange and Leader–Member . Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06), 04020061.
Lu, H, Behbahani, S, Azimi, M, Matthews, J C, Han, S and Iseley, T (2020) Trenchless Construction Technologies for Oil and Gas Pipelines: State-of-the-Art Review. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Mohammadi, A, Amador-Jimenez, L and Nasiri, F (2020) Reliable, Effective, and Sustainable Urban Railways: A Model for Optimal Planning and Asset Management. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Sherafat, B, Ahn, C R, Akhavian, R, Behzadan, A H, Golparvar-Fard, M, Kim, H, Lee, Y, Rashidi, A and Azar, E R (2020) Automated Methods for Activity Recognition of Construction Workers and Equipment: State-of-the-Art Review. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Shoieb, K, Serror, M H and Marzouk, M (2020) Web-Based Tool for Interoperability among Structural Analysis Applications. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Yao, M, Wang, F, Chen, Z and Ye, H (2020) Optimal Incentive Contract with Asymmetric Cost Information. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
- Type: Journal Article
- Keywords: Construction project; Asymmetric information; Incentive contract design;
- ISBN/ISSN: 0733-9364
- URL: https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001832
- Abstract:
As a prevalent problem for construction projects, contractor cost details are unobserved or unknown to the owner. This paper considers a risk-averse owner (he) who engages a risk-neutral contractor (she) to complete a project when the contractor’s overtime cost information is unknown to the owner. The owner designs a menu of incentive contracts for the contractor to choose/to negotiate with the contractor to maximize his profit. The incentive payment is determined by the saved time relative to the predetermined deadline. We provide optimal incentive contract menus under symmetric and asymmetric information settings, respectively. Moreover, by comparing the terms of optimal incentive contracts under both information settings, we find that even though the duration of a low-cost contractor will not change with the information setting. However, the owner has to pay more to induce the low-cost contractor to choose the appropriate contract under the asymmetric information setting. Meanwhile, the high-cost contractor receives less payment and completes the project later under the asymmetric information setting. In addition, we find the value of information increases with the level of risk aversion and the gap of costs, and is concave with respect to the probability of high-cost type or that of low-cost type. Finally, we use real data to verify our theoretical findings.
Zhang, M, Cao, Z, Yang, Z and Zhao, X (2020) Utilizing Computer Vision and Fuzzy Inference to Evaluate Level of Collision Safety for Workers and Equipment in a Dynamic Environment. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).
Zhang, X and Tariq, S (2020) Failure Mechanisms in International Water PPP Projects: A Public Sector Perspective. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 146(06).